The opposite view of the matter, showing equally the value of the alliance, was well set forth in the memorial by which, under the civil name of an invitation, the crowns of France and Spain ordered Portugal to declare against England.
The grounds of that memorial--namely, the unequal benefit to Portugal from the connection and the disregard of Portuguese neutrality--have already been given.

The King of Portugal refused to abandon the alliance, for the professed reason that it was ancient and wholly defensive.

To this the two crowns replied:-- "The defensive alliance is actually an offensive one by the situation of the Portuguese dominions and the nature of the English power.

The English squadrons cannot in all seasons keep the sea, nor cruise on the principal coasts of France and Spain for cutting off the navigation of the two countries, without the ports and assistance of Portugal; and these islanders could not insult all maritime Europe, if the whole riches of Portugal did not pass through their hands, which furnishes them with the means to make war and renders the alliance truly and properly offensive." Between the two arguments the logic of situation and power prevailed.
Portugal found England nearer and more dangerous than Spain, and remained for generations of trial true to the alliance.

This relationship was as useful to England as any of her colonial possessions, depending of course upon the scene of the principal operations at any particular time.
The preliminaries of peace were signed at Fontainebleau, November 3, 1762; the definitive treaty on the 10th of the following February, at Paris, whence the peace takes its name.
By its terms France renounced all claims to Canada, Nova Scotia, and all the islands of the St.Lawrence; along with Canada she ceded the valley of the Ohio and all her territory on the east side of the Mississippi, except the city of New Orleans.