The chief points of strategic interest are the failure of Louis, having a decided superiority at sea, properly to support James II.

in Ireland, which remained faithful to him, and the gradual disappearance from the ocean of the great French fleets, which Louis XIV.

could no longer maintain, owing to the expense of that continental policy which he had chosen for himself.

A third point of rather minor interest is the peculiar character and large proportions taken on by the commerce-destroying and privateering warfare of the French, as their large fleets were disappearing.

This, and the great effect produced by it, will appear at first to contradict what has been said as to the general inadequacy of such a warfare when not supported by fleets; but an examination of the conditions, which will be made later on, will show that the contradiction is rather apparent than real.
Taught by the experience of the last conflict, the chief effort of the French king, in the general war he had brought upon himself, should have been directed against the sea powers,--against William of Orange and the Anglo-Dutch alliance.