M.de Martel, commanding the van of the French, and consequently the leading subdivision of the allied fleet, was ordered to stretch ahead, go about and gain to windward of the Dutch van, so as to place it between two fires.

This he did (B); but as soon as Bankert--the same who had manoeuvred so judiciously at Solebay the year before--saw the danger, he put his helm up and ran through the remaining twenty ships of D'Estrees' squadron with his own twelve (C),--a feat as creditable to him as it was discreditable to the French; and then wearing round stood down to De Ruyter, who was hotly engaged with Rupert (C').

He was not followed by D'Estrees, who suffered him to carry this important reinforcement to the Dutch main attack undisturbed.

This practically ended the French share in the fight.
[Illustration: Pl.IV.TEXEL.Aug.21, 1673.] Rupert, during his action with De Ruyter, kept off continually, with the object of drawing the Dutch farther away from their coast, so that if the wind shifted they might not be able to regain its shelter.

De Ruyter followed him, and the consequent separation of the centre from the van (B, B') was one of the reasons alleged by D'Estrees for his delay.