It is not unlikely that, in the event of a war between maritime nations, an attempt may be made by the one having a great sea power and wishing to break down its enemy's commerce, to interpret the phrase "effective blockade" in the manner that best suits its interests at the time; to assert that the speed and disposal of its ships make the blockade effective at much greater distances and with fewer ships than formerly.

The determination of such a question will depend, not upon the weaker belligerent, but upon neutral powers; it will raise the issue between belligerent and neutral rights; and if the belligerent have a vastly overpowering navy he may carry his point, just as England, when possessing the mastery of the seas, long refused to admit the doctrine of the neutral flag covering the goods.
FOOTNOTES: [16] Davies: History of Holland.
[17] Republique d'Angleterre.
[18] Lefevre-Pontalis: Jean de Witt.
[19] Martin: History of France.
[20] Gougeard: Marine de Guerre.
[21] Since the above was written, the experience of the English autumn manoeuvres of 1888 has verified this statement; not indeed that any such experiment was needed to establish a self-evident fact.
[22] Chabaud-Arnault: Revue Mar.

et Col.

1885.
[23] The recent development of rapid-firing and machine guns, with the great increase of their calibre and consequent range and penetration, reproduces this same step in the cycle of progress.
[24] Gougeard: Marine de Guerre.
[25] Vol.lxxxii.p.

137.
[26] Memoires du Cte.