Compare this action with those of 1652, and one plain fact stares you in the face,--that between the two dates naval tactics have undergone a revolution.
"Such were the changes that distinguish the war of 1665 from that of 1652.

As in the latter epoch, the admiral still thinks the weather-gage an advantage for his fleet; but it is no longer, from the tactical point of view, the principal, we might almost say the sole, preoccupation.

Now he wishes above all to keep his fleet in good order and compact as long as possible, so as to keep the power of _combining_, during the action, the movements of the different squadrons.

Look at Ruyter, at the end of the Four Days' Fight; with great difficulty he has kept to windward of the English fleet, yet he does not hesitate to sacrifice this advantage in order to unite the two parts of his fleet, which are separated by the enemy.

If at the later fight off the North Foreland great intervals exist between the Dutch squadrons, if the rear afterward continues to withdraw from the centre, Ruyter deplores such a fault as the chief cause of his defeat.