Looking simply to the principle underlying the theory, and disregarding the seeming tactical clumsiness of the special groups proposed, the question is: Shall there be introduced between the natural commands of the admiral and of the captains of individual ships a third artificial contrivance, which on the one hand will in effect partly supersede the supreme authority, and on the other will partly fetter the discretion of commanders of ships?
A further difficulty springing from the narrow principle of support specially due to particular ships, on which the group system rests, is this: that when signals can no longer be seen, the duty of the captain to his own ship and to the fleet at large will be complicated by his duty to observe certain relations to particular ships; which particular ships must in time come to have undue prominence in his views.

The group formation had its day of trial in old times, and disappeared before the test of experience; whether in its restored form it will survive, time will show.

It may be said, before quitting the subject, that as an order of sailing, corresponding to the route-step of an army in march, a loose group formation has some advantages; maintaining some order without requiring that rigid exactness of position, to observe which by day and night must be a severe strain on captain and deck-officers.

Such a route-order should not, however, be permitted until a fleet has reached high tactical precision.
To return to the question of fire-ships and torpedo-boats, the role of the latter, it is often said, is to be found in that _melee_ which is always to succeed a couple of headlong passes between the opposing fleets.

In the smoke and confusion of that hour is the opportunity of the torpedo-boat.