A contemporary writer has thus expressed his view of the policy of France at this period:-- "France, by engaging so heartily as she has done in the German war, has drawn away so much of her attention and her revenue from her navy that it enabled us to give such a blow to her maritime strength as possibly she may never be able to recover.
Her engagement in the German war has likewise drawn her from the defence of her colonies, by which means we have conquered some of the most considerable she possessed.

It has withdrawn her from the protection of her trade, by which it is entirely destroyed, while that of England has never, in the profoundest peace, been in so flourishing a condition.

So that, by embarking in this German war, France has suffered herself to be undone, so far as regards her particular and immediate quarrel with England." In the Seven Years' War France lost thirty-seven ships-of-the-line and fifty-six frigates,--a force three times as numerous as the whole navy of the United States at any time in the days of sailing-ships.

"For the first time since the Middle Ages," says a French historian, speaking of the same war, "England had conquered France single-handed, almost without allies, France having powerful auxiliaries.

She had conquered solely by the superiority of her government." Yes; but it was by the superiority of her government using the tremendous weapon of her sea power,--the reward of a consistent policy perseveringly directed to one aim.
The profound humiliation of France, which reached its depths between 1760 and 1763, at which latter date she made peace, has an instructive lesson for the United States in this our period of commercial and naval decadence.