There was no relief possible for him except by expelling the enemy from Missionary Ridge and about Chattanooga.
On the 4th of November Longstreet left our front with about fifteen thousand troops, besides Wheeler's cavalry, five thousand more, to go against Burnside.

The situation seemed desperate, and was more aggravating because nothing could be done until Sherman should get up.
The authorities at Washington were now more than ever anxious for the safety of Burnside's army, and plied me with dispatches faster than ever, urging that something should be done for his relief.

On the 7th, before Longstreet could possibly have reached Knoxville, I ordered Thomas peremptorily to attack the enemy's right, so as to force the return of the troops that had gone up the valley.

I directed him to take mules, officers' horses, or animals wherever he could get them to move the necessary artillery.

But he persisted in the declaration that he could not move a single piece of artillery, and could not see how he could possibly comply with the order.