I on the contrary reject demonstration by syllogism, as acting too confusedly, and letting nature slip out of its hands.

For although no one can doubt that things which agree in a middle term agree with one another (which is a proposition of mathematical certainty), yet it leaves an opening for deception; which is this.

The syllogism consists of propositions; propositions of words; and words are the tokens and signs of notions.
Now if the very notions of the mind (which are as the soul of words and the basis of the whole structure) be improperly and over-hastily abstracted from facts, vague not sufficiently definite, faulty in short in many ways, the whole edifice tumbles.

I therefore reject the syllogism; and that not only as regards principles (for to principles the logicians themselves do not apply it) but also as regards middle propositions; which, though obtainable no doubt by the syllogism, are, when so obtained, barren of works, remote from practice, and altogether unavailable for the active department of the sciences.
Although therefore I leave to the syllogism and these famous and boasted modes of demonstration their jurisdiction over popular arts and such as are matter of opinion (in which department I leave all as it is), yet in dealing with the nature of things I use induction throughout, and that in the minor propositions as well as the major.
For I consider induction to be that form of demonstration which upholds the sense, and closes with nature, and comes to the very brink of operation, if it does not actually deal with it.
Hence it follows that the order of demonstration is likewise inverted.
For hitherto the proceeding has been to fly at once from the sense and particulars up to the most general propositions, as certain fixed poles for the argument to turn upon, and from these to derive the rest by middle terms a short way, no doubt, but precipitate, and one which will never lead to nature, though it offers an easy and ready way to disputation.

Now my plan is to proceed regularly and gradually from one axiom to another, so that the most general are not reached till the last but then when you do come to them you find them to be not empty notions, but well defined, and such as nature would really recognise as her first principles, and such as lie at the heart and marrow of things.
But the greatest change I introduce is in the form itself of induction and the judgment made thereby.