The late Shah's considerate treatment of him on all occasions also led him to make ill-judged requests for such extended rule in the South that his father said Persia was not large enough for two Shahs.

I think his idea of a viceroyalty in the South came from foolish vanity, and not from any serious thought of semi-independence, as some who heard him speak on this subject supposed.
His father always wrote to him as 'my well-beloved first-born,' and up to 1888 he allowed him great power and freedom of action.

He was fond of 'playing at soldiers,' and he went to work at this amusement with such energy and will that he formed a numerous and very efficient army under well-trained officers, too good, the Shah thought, to be quite safe.
Nasr-ed-Din sent an officer whom he could trust to Isfahan to bring back a true report on the army there; and such was the Zil's self-assurance, that he went out of his way to show him everything, and to make the most of his force.
The Shah, on learning all, became jealous or suspicious, and ordered the reduction of the troops to the moderate limits really required for provincial purposes.

As affairs then stood, the Zil, with his well-appointed army, was master of the situation, but he was constrained to submit.

He singled out the Amin-es-Sultan (now the Sadr Azem) as his enemy at Court, and regarded him as the strong adviser who influenced the Shah.