This may seem adverse to his principle of Utility, as it is to the doctrine of an Intuitive Sense of Right and Wrong.

He allows, however, for the different ways that people may view Utility, seeing that the consequences of acting are often difficult to estimate, and people may agree in an end without agreeing in the means.

Still, he pays too little attention to the sentimental likings and dislikings that frequently overbear the sense of Utility; scarcely recognizing it, except in one passage, where he dwells on the superstitions that mingle with a regard to the consequences of actions in determining right.
We shall now repeat the leading points of Hume's system, in the usual order.
I .-- The Standard of Right and Wrong is Utility, or a reference to the Happiness of mankind.

This is the ground, as wall as the motive, of moral approbation.
II .-- As to the nature of the Moral Faculty, he contends that it is a compound of Reason, and Humane or Generous Sentiment.
He does not introduce the subject of Free-will into Morals.
He contends strongly for the existence of Disinterested Sentiment, or Benevolence; but scarcely recognizes it as leading to absolute and uncompensated self-sacrifice.

He does not seem to see that as far as the approbation of benevolent actions is concerned, we are anything but disinterested parties.