He remarks that, neither in English nor in any other modern tongue, is the boundary fixed between virtues and talents, vices and defects; that praise is given to natural endowments, as well as to voluntary exertions.

The epithets _intellectual_ and _moral_ do not precisely divide the virtues; neither does the contrast of _head_ and _heart_; many virtuous qualities partake of both ingredients.

So the sentiment of _conscious worth_, or of its opposite, is affected by what is not in our power, as well as by what is; by the goodness or badness of our memory, as well as by continence or dissoluteness of conduct.

Without endowments of the understanding, the best intentions will not procure esteem.
The ancient moralists included in the virtues what are obviously natural endowments.

Prudence, according to Cicero, involved sagacity or powers of judgment.