His most obvious thought would be to give the largest possessions to the most virtuous, so as to give the power of doing good where there was the most inclination.

But so unpracticable is this design, that although sometimes conceived, it is never executed; the civil magistrate knows that it would be utterly destructive of human society; sublime as may be the ideal justice that it supposes, he sets it aside on the calculation of its bad consequences.
Seeing also that, with nature's liberality, were all her gifts equally distributed, every one would have so good a share that no one would have a title to complain; and seeing, farther, that this is the only type of perfect equality or ideal justice--there is no good ground for falling short of it but the knowledge that the attempt would be pernicious to society.

The writers on the Law of Nature, whatever principles they begin with, must assign as the ultimate reason of law the necessities and convenience of mankind.

Uninstructed nature could never make the distinction between _mine_ and _yours_; it is a purely artificial product of society.

Even when this distinction is established, and justice requires it to be adhered to, yet we do not scruple in extraordinary cases to violate justice in an individual case for the safety of the people at large.
When the interests of society require a rule of justice, but do not indicate any rule in particular, the resort is to some _analogy_ with a rule already established on grounds of the general interest.
For determining what is a man's property, there may be many statutes, customs, precedents, analogies, some constant and inflexible, some variable and arbitrary, but all professedly terminating in the interests of human society.