The common state of society is a medium between the extreme suppositions now made: we have our self-partialities, but have learnt the value of equity; we have few enjoyments by nature, but a considerable number by industry.

Hence we have the ideas of Property; to these Justice is essential, and it thus derives its moral obligation.
The poetic fictions of the Golden Age, and the philosophic fictions of a State of Nature, equally adopt the same fundamental assumption; in the one, justice was unnecessary, in the other, it was inadmissible.
So, if there were a race of creatures so completely servile as never to contest any privilege with us, nor resent any infliction, which is very much our position with the lower animals, justice would have no place in our dealings with them.

Or, suppose once more, that each person possessed within himself every faculty for existence, and were isolated from every other; so solitary a being would be as incapable of justice as of speech.

The sphere of this duty begins with society; and extends as society extends, and as it contributes to the well-being of the individual members of society.
The author next examines the _particular laws_ embodying justice and determining property.

He supposes a creature, having reason, but unskilled in human nature, to deliberate with himself how to distribute property.