Though he adopted this ultimate interpretation of the facts, Helvetius was by no means the 'low and loose moralist' that he has been described to be; and, in particular, his own practice displayed a rare benevolence.
DAVID HUME.

[1711-1776.] The Ethical views of Hume are contained in '_An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals_.' In an Introductory Section (I.) he treats of the GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF MORALS.
After describing those that profess to deny the reality of the distinction of Right and Wrong, as disingenuous disputants, useless to reason with,--he states the great problem of Morals to be, whether the foundation is REASON or SENTIMENT; whether our knowledge of moral distinctions is attained by a chain of argument and induction, or by an immediate feeling or finer internal sense.
Specious arguments may be urged on both sides.

On the side of Reason, it may be contended, that the justice and injustice of actions are often a subject of argument and controversy like the sciences; whereas if they appealed at once to a sense, they would be as unsusceptible of truth or falsehood as the harmony of verse, the tenderness of passion, or the brilliancy of wit.
In reply, the supporters of Sentiment may urge that the character of virtue is to be _amiable_, and of vice to be _odious_, which are not intellectual distinctions.

The end of moral distinctions is to influence the feelings and determine the will, which no mere assent of the understanding can do.

Extinguish our _feelings_ towards virtue and vice, and morality would cease to have any influence on our lives.
The arguments on both sides have so much force in them, that we may reasonably suspect that Reason and Sentiment both concur in our moral determinations.