There are also _turbulent_ passions of a benevolent kind, whose end is their simple gratification.

Hutcheson has thus a higher and lower grade of Benevolence; the higher would correspond to the disinterestedness that arises from the operation of _fixed ideas_, the lower to those affections that are generated in us by pleasing objects.
He has no discussion on the freedom of the will, contenting himself with mere voluntariness as an element in moral approbation or censure.
III .-- The Summum Bonum is fully discussed.

He places the pleasures of sympathy and moral goodness (also of piety) in the highest rank, the passive sensations in the lowest.

Instead of making morality, like health, a neutral state (though an indispensable condition of happiness), he ascribes to it the highest positive gratification.
IV .-- In proceeding upon Rights, instead of Duties, as a basis of classification, Hutcheson is following in the wake of the jurisconsults, rather than of the moralists.

When he enters into the details of moral duties, he throws aside his 'moral sense,' and draws his rules, most of them from Roman Law, the rest chiefly from manifest convenience.
V.and VI .-- Hutcheson's relation to Politics and Theology requires no comment.
BERNARD DE MANDEVILLE.