The pleasures of _honour_, when our conduct is approved, are also among the highest, and when, as commonly happens, they are conjoined with the last two classes, it is the height of human bliss.
The pleasures of _mirth_, such as they are, fall in best with virtue, and so, too, the pleasures of _wealth_ and _power_, in themselves unsatisfying.

Anger, malice, revenge, &c., are not without their uses, and give momentary pleasure as removing an uneasiness from the subject of them; but they are not to be compared with the sympathetic feelings, because their effects cannot long be regarded with satisfaction.

His general conclusion is, that as the highest personal satisfaction is had in the most benevolent dispositions, the same course of conduct is recommended alike by the two great determinations of our nature, towards our own good and the good of others.

He then compares the several sorts of pain, which, he says, are not necessarily in the proportion of the corresponding pleasures.

Allowing the great misery of bodily pain, he yet argues that, at the worst, it is not to be compared for a moment to the pain of the worst wrong-doing.