On the other hand, to desire the welfare of others in the interest of ourselves is not benevolence nor virtue.

What we have to seek are benevolent affections terminating ultimately in the good of others, and constituted by nature (either alone, or mayhap corroborated by some views of interest) 'the immediate cause of moral approbation.' Now, anything to be had from men could not raise within us such affections, or make us careful about anything beyond external deportment.

Nor could rewards from God, or the wish for self-approbation, create such affections, although, on the supposition of their existence, these may well help to foster them.

It is benevolent _dispositions_ that we morally approve; but dispositions are not to be raised by will.

Moreover, they are often found where there has been least thought of cultivating them; and, sometimes, in the form of parental affection, gratitude, &c., they are followed so little for the sake of honour and reward, that though their absence is condemned, they are themselves hardly accounted virtuous at all.