[Moral Science; A Compendium of Ethics by Alexander Bain]@TWC D-Link bookMoral Science; A Compendium of Ethics PART II 271/699
He then adduces the ordinary arguments to show, that seeking the good of others is a positive gratification in itself, and fraught with pleasure in its consequences. In summary, Butler's views stand thus:-- I .-- His Standard of Right and Wrong is the subjective Faculty, called by him Reflection, or Conscience.
He assumes such an amount of uniformity in human beings, in regard to this Faculty, as to settle all questions that arise. II .-- His Psychological scheme is the threefold division of the mind already brought out; Conscience being one division, and a distinct and primitive element of our constitution. He has no Psychology of the Will; nor does he anywhere inquire into the problem of Liberty and Necessity. He maintains the existence of Disinterested Benevolence, by saying that Disinterested action, as opposed to direct self-regard, is a much wider fact of our mental system, than the regard to the welfare of others.
We have seen that this is a mere stroke of ingenuity, and owes its plausible appearance to his making our associated ends the primary ends of our being. III .-- With regard to the Summum Bonum, or the theory of Happiness, he holds that men cannot be happy by the pursuit of mere self; but must give way to their benevolent impulses as well, all under the guidance of conscience.
In short, virtue is happiness, even in this world; and, if there be any exception to the rule, it will be rectified in another world.
This is in fact the Platonic view.
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