Secondly, they are accompanied with the feelings of good or of ill desert, which good or ill desert is irrespective of the good of society.

Thirdly, the perception of ill desert has regard to the capacities of the agent.
Fourthly, Prudence, or regard to ourselves, is a fair subject of moral approbation, and imprudence of the contrary.

Our own self-interest seems to require strengthening by other men's manifested pleasure and displeasure.

Still, this position is by no means indisputable, and the author is willing to give up the words 'virtue' and 'vice,' as applicable to prudence and folly; and to contend merely that our moral faculty is not indifferent to this class of actions.

Fifthly, Virtue is not wholly resolvable into Benevolence (that is, the general good, or Utility[19]).