On the influence of habit on action his view is Aristotelian.

His own specialty lies in his judging actions solely with reference to the intention _( intentio)_ of the agent, and this intention with reference to conscience _( conscientia)_.

All actions, he says, are in themselves indifferent, and not to be called good or evil except from the intention of the doer.

_Peccatum_, is properly only the action that is done with evil intent; and where this is present, where the mental consent _( consensus)_ is clearly established, there is _peccatum_, though the action remains unexecuted.

When the _consensus_ is absent, as in original sin, there is only _vitium_; hence, a life without _peccata_ is not impossible to men in the exercise of their freedom, however difficult it may be.
The supremacy assigned by him to the subjective element of conscience appears in such phrases as, there is no sin except against conscience; also in the opinion he pronounces, that, though in the case of a mistaken moral conviction, an action is not to be called good, yet it is not so bad as an action objectively right but done against conscience.