'Recollect that in what he says or does, he follows his own sense of propriety, not yours.

He must do what appears to him right, not what appears to you; if he judges wrongly, it is he that is hurt, for he is the person deceived.

Always repeat to yourself, in such a case: The man has acted on his own opinion.' The reason here given by Epictetus is an instance, memorable in ethical theory, of respect for individual dissenting conviction, even in an extreme case; and it must be taken in conjunction with his other doctrine, that damage thus done to us unjustly is really little or no damage, except so far as we ourselves give pungency to it by our irrational susceptibilities and associations.

We see that the Stoic submerges, as much as he can, the pre-eminence of his own individual self, and contemplates himself from the point of view of another, only as one among many.

But he does not erect the happiness of others into a direct object of his own positive pursuit, beyond the reciprocities of family, citizenship, and common humanity.