They differed, indeed, on the question what the proper type of character was: but each of them aimed at the same general end--a new type of character, regulating the grades of susceptibility to different motives.

And the purpose of all and each of these moralists precludes the theory of free-will--_i.e._, the theory that our volitions are self-originating and unpredictable.
III .-- We must consider next the Stoical theory of Happiness, or rather of the _Good_, which with them was proclaimed to be the sole, indispensable, and self-sufficing condition of Happiness.

They declared that Pleasure was no part of Good, and Pain no part of Evil; therefore, that even relief from pain was not necessary to Good or Happiness.
This, however, if followed out consistently, would dispense with all morality and all human endeavour.

Accordingly, the Stoics were obliged to let in some pleasures as an object of pursuit, and some pains as an object of avoidance, though not under the title of Good and Evil, but with the inferior name of _Sumenda_ and _Rejicienda_.[9] Substantially, therefore, they held that pains are an evil, but, by a proper discipline, may be triumphed over.

They disallowed the direct and ostensible pursuit of pleasure as an end (the point of view of Epicurus), but allured their followers partly by promising them the victory over pain, and partly by certain enjoyments of an elevated cast that grew out of their plan of life.
Pain of every kind, whether from the casualties of existence, or from, the severity of the Stoical virtues, was to be met by a discipline of endurance, a hardening process, which, if persisted in, would succeed in reducing the mind to a state of _Apathy_ or indifference.