Besides, to me the arguments of Cleomedon appeared utterly inconsistent.

He made light of the war with the Romans; and asserted, that the issue of it would be similar to that of the former, which they waged against Philip.

If such the case, why does he, at a distance, solicit our assistance; rather than come hither in person, and defend us, his old allies, both from Nabis and from the Romans?
Us, do I say?
Why, on this showing, has he suffered Eretria and Carystus to be taken?
Why so many cities of Thessaly?
Why Locris and Phocis?
Why does he at present suffer Elatia to be besieged?
Did he, either through compulsion, or fear, or choice, quit the straits of Epirus, and those impregnable fastnesses on the river Aous; and why, abandoning the pass which he was occupying, did he retire altogether into his own kingdom?
If of his own will he gave up so many allies to the ravages of the enemy, what objection can he make to these allies consulting for their own safety?
If through fear, he ought to pardon the like fear in us.

If he retired defeated by force of arms, let me ask you, Cleomedon, shall we, Achaeans, be able to withstand the Roman arms, which you, Macedonians, have not withstood?
Are we to give credit to your assertion, that the Romans do not employ, in the present war, greater forces or greater strength than they did in the former, rather than regard the facts themselves?
In the first instance, they aided the Aetolians with a fleet; they sent not to the war either a consul as commander, or a consular army.

The maritime cities of Philip's allies were in terror and confusion; but the inland places were so secure against the Roman arms, that Philip ravaged the country of the Aetolians, while they in vain implored succour from those arms.