That no reason for the crisis existed was shown by the fact that the succeeding ministry adopted the identical measure on which Crispi was defeated.

But the King (whose death has occurred while I am revising these chapters) showed on many occasions that, though loyal to his constitutional obligation so far as deference to parliamentary forms is concerned, he never had the nerve to assume a responsible attitude or maintain the authority of the throne; and, while he was ready to abdicate if popular opinion demanded it, he was unable to withstand a factious and revolutionary movement as his father had done, by calling to his support the statesmen who could maintain order when menaced.

His form of constitutionality was perfectly adapted to a country where the Conservative forces were supreme and the institutions solid; but in a half-consolidated monarchy, attacked from within and without by dissolvent influences as is Italy at present, he was a cause of weakness to good government.

And Rudin assured me when I went to pay the formal visit of congratulation on his accession to power, that the King had said that he was in the position of the young Emperor of Germany when he threw off the yoke of Bismarck--he was tired of Crispi's strong hand.

The King later denied the statement in an audience he gave me, but I am afraid that Rudin was, for a novelty, nearer the truth.
Rudin as minister of foreign affairs began with a blunder which might well have been fatal.