Her whole foreign policy, in spite of all protestations of peace, follows the single aim of gaining allies for this attack.

Her alliance with Russia, her _entente_ with England, are inspired with this spirit; her present intimate relations with this latter nation are traceable to the fact that the French policy hoped, and with good reason, for more active help from England's hostility to Germany than from Russia.
The colonial policy of France pursues primarily the object of acquiring a material, and, if possible, military superiority over Germany.

The establishment of a native African army, the contemplated introduction of a modified system of conscription in Algeria, and the political annexation of Morocco, which offers excellent raw material for soldiers, so clearly exhibit this intention, that there can be no possible illusion as to its extent and meaning.
Since France has succeeded in bringing her military strength to approximately the same level as Germany, since she has acquired in her North African Empire the possibility of considerably increasing that strength, since she has completely outstripped Germany in the sphere of colonial policy, and has not only kept up, but also revived, the French sympathies of Alsace and Lorraine, the conclusion is obvious: France will not abandon the paths of an anti-German policy, but will do her best to excite hostility against us, and to thwart German interests in every quarter of the globe.

When she came to an understanding with the Italians, that she should be given a free hand in Morocco if she allowed them to occupy Tripoli, a wedge was driven into the Triple Alliance which threatens to split it.

It may be regarded as highly improbable that she will maintain honourably and with no _arriere-pensee_ the obligations undertaken in the interests of German commerce in Morocco.
The suppression of these interests was, in fact, a marked feature of the French Morocco policy, which was conspicuously anti-German.