8, 9.
I should be inclined to adopt an interpretation of the unusual phrase [Greek: harpagmon] somewhat different both from the Socinian and the Church version:--"who being in the form of God did not 'think equality with God a thing to be seized with violence', but made, &c." Ib.p.

160.
Is a mere creature a fit lieutenant or representative of God in personal or prerogative acts of government and power?
Must not every being be represented by one of his own kind, a man by a man, an angel by an angel, in such acts as are proper to their natures?
and must not God then be represented by one who is God?
Is any creature capable of the government of the world?
Does not this require infinite wisdom and infinite power?
And can God communicate infinite wisdom and infinite power to a creature or a finite nature?
That is, can a creature be made a true and essential God?
This is sound reasoning.

It is to be regretted that Sherlock had not confined himself to logical comments on the Scripture, instead of attempting metaphysical solutions.
Ib.pp.

161-3.
I find little or nothing to 'object to' in this exposition, from pp.
161-163 inclusively, of 'Phil'.

ii.