147-8.
Yes; you'll say, that there should be three Persons, each of which is God, and yet but one God, is a contradiction: but what principle of natural reason does it contradict?
Surely never did argument vertiginate more! I had just acceded to Sherlock's exposition of the Trinity, as the Supreme Being, his reflex act of self-consciousness and his love, all forming one supreme mind; and now he tells me, that each is the whole Supreme Mind, and denies that three, each 'per se' the whole God, are not the same as three Gods! I grant that division and separation are terms inapplicable, yet surely three distinct though undivided Gods, are three Gods.

That the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are the one true God, I fully believe; but not Sherlock's exposition of the doctrine.

Nay, I think it would have been far better to have worded the mystery thus:--The Father together with his Son and Spirit, is the one true God.
"Each 'per se' God." This is the [Greek: proton mega pseudos] of Sherlock's scheme.

Each of the three is whole God, because neither is, or can be 'per se'; the Father himself being 'a se', but not 'per se'.
Ib.p.

149.
For it is demonstrable that if there be three Persons and one God, each Person must be God, and yet there cannot be three distinct Gods, but one.