I.p.

3.
Some new philosophers will tell you that the notion of a spirit or an immaterial substance is a contradiction; for by substance they understand nothing but matter, and then an immaterial substance is immaterial matter, that is, matter and no matter, which is a contradiction; but yet this does not prove an immaterial substance to be a contradiction, unless they could first prove that there is no substance but matter; and that they cannot conceive any other substance but matter, does not prove that there is no other.
Certainly not: but if not only they, but Dr.Sherlock himself and all mankind, are incapable of attaching any sense to the term substance, but that of matter,--then for us it would be a contradiction, or a groundless assertion.

Thus: By 'substance' I do not mean the only notion we can attach to the word; but a somewhat, I know not what, may, for aught I know, not be contradictory to spirit! Why should we use the equivocal word, 'substance' (after all but an 'ens logicum'), instead of the definite term 'self-subsistent ?' We are equally conscious of mind, and of that which we call 'body;' and the only possible philosophical questions are these three: 1.

Are they co-ordinate as agent and re-agent; 2.

Or is the one subordinate to the other, as effect to cause, and which is the cause or ground, which the effect or product; 3.