105.
They always seemed to me to act a very ridiculous part, who contend, that the effect of the divine decree is absolutely irreconcilable with human liberty; because the natural and necessary liberty of a rational creature is to act or choose from a rational motive, or spontaneously, and of purpose: but who sees not, that, on the supposition of the most absolute decree, this liberty is not taken away, but rather established and confirmed?
For the decree is, 'that such an one shall make choice of, or do some particular thing freely.

And whoever pretends to deny, that whatever is done or chosen, whether good or indifferent, is so done or chosen, or, at least, may be so, espouses an absurdity.' I fear, I fear, that this is a sophism not worthy of Archbishop Leighton.

It seems to me tantamount to saying--"I force that man to do so or so without my forcing him." But however that may be, the following sentences are more precious than diamonds.

They are divine.
Ib.Lect.XI.p.

113.
For that this world, compounded of so many and such heterogeneous parts, should proceed, by way of natural and necessary emanation, from that one first, present, and most simple nature, nobody, I imagine, could believe, or in the least suspect * * *.