A land army and the system of a civic militia no longer sufficed.

It was essential to create a fleet, and, what was more difficult, to employ it; it was essential to find out the true points of attack and defence, to combine and to direct masses, to calculate expeditions extending over long periods and great distances, and to adjust their co-operation; if these things were not attended to, even an enemy far weaker in the tactics of the field might easily vanquish a stronger opponent.

Is there any wonder that the reins of government in such an exigency slipped from the hands of a deliberative assembly and of commanding burgomasters?
It was plain, that at the beginning of the war the Romans did not know what they were undertaking; it was only during the course of the struggle that the inadequacies of their system, one after another, forced themselves on their notice--the want of a naval power, the lack of fixed military leadership, the insufficiency of their generals, the total uselessness of their admirals.

In part these evils were remedied by energy and good fortune; as was the case with the want of a fleet.

That mighty creation, however, was but a grand makeshift, and always remained so.