Or they might neglect the islands and throw themselves at once with all their strength on Africa, not, in the adventurous style of Agathocles, burning their vessels behind them and staking all on the victory of a desperate band, but covering with a strong fleet the communications between the African invading army and Italy; and in that case a peace on moderate terms might be expected from the consternation of the enemy after the first successes, or, if the Romans chose, they might by pushing matters to an extremity compel the enemy to entire surrender.
They chose, in the first instance, the former plan of operations.
In the year after the battle of Mylae (495) the consul Lucius Scipio captured the port of Aleria in Corsica--we still possess the tombstone of the general, which makes mention of this deed--and made Corsica a naval station against Sardinia.

An attempt to establish a footing in Ulbia on the northern coast of that island failed, because the fleet wanted troops for landing.

In the succeeding year (496) it was repeated with better success, and the open villages along the coast were plundered; but no permanent establishment of the Romans took place.

Nor was greater progress made in Sicily.

Hamilcar conducted the war with energy and adroitness, not only by force of arms on sea and land, but also by political proselytism.