A man who, by a violent fit of the gout in his limbs, finds a doziness in his head, or a want of appetite in his stomach removed, desires to be eased too of the pain of his feet or hands, (for wherever there is pain, there is a desire to be rid of it,) though yet, whilst he apprehends that the removal of the pain may translate the noxious humour to a more vital part, his will is never determined to any one action that may serve to remove this pain.

Whence it is evident that desiring and willing are two distinct acts of the mind; and consequently, that the will, which is but the power of volition, is much more distinct from desire.
31.

Uneasiness determines the Will.
To return, then, to the inquiry, what is it that determines the will in regard to our actions?
And that, upon second thoughts, I am apt to imagine is not, as is generally supposed, the greater good in view; but some (and for the most part the most pressing) UNEASINESS a man is at present under.

This is that which successively determines the will, and sets us upon those actions we perform.

This uneasiness we may call, as it is, DESIRE; which is an uneasiness of the mind for want of some absent good.