For such a preferring of action to its absence, is the willing of it: and we can scarce tell how to imagine any being freer, than to be able to do what he wills.

So that in respect of actions within the reach of such a power in him, a man seems as free as it is possible for freedom to make him.
22.

In respect of willing, a Man is not free.
But the inquisitive mind of man, willing to shift off from himself, as far as he can, all thoughts of guilt, though it be by putting himself into a worse state than that of fatal necessity, is not content with this: freedom, unless it reaches further than this, will not serve the turn: and it passes for a good plea, that a man is not free at all, if he be not as FREE TO WILL as he is to ACT WHAT HE WILLS.

Concerning a man's liberty, there yet, therefore, is raised this further question, WHETHER A MAN BE FREE TO WILL?
which I think is what is meant, when it is disputed whether the will be free.

And as to that I imagine.
23.