And, in truth, it would be very strange if it should be otherwise; as strange as it would be for a man to be free without being able to be free.
21.

But to the Agent, or Man.
To return, then, to the inquiry about liberty, I think the question is not proper, WHETHER THE WILL BE FREE, but WHETHER A MAN BE FREE.

Thus, I think, First, That so far as any one can, by the direction or choice of his mind, preferring the existence of any action to the non-existence of that action, and vice versa, make IT to exist or not exist, so far HE is free.

For if I can, by a thought directing the motion of my finger, make it move when it was at rest, or vice versa, it is evident, that in respect of that I am free: and if I can, by a like thought of my mind, preferring one to the other, produce either words or silence, I am at liberty to speak or hold my peace: and as far as this power reaches, of acting or not acting, by the determination of his own thought preferring either, so far is a man free.

For how can we think any one freer, than to have the power to do what he will?
And so far as any one can, by preferring any action to its not being, or rest to any action, produce that action or rest, so far can he do what he will.