It was usual with our commanders to take them prisoners, and sell them: now this circumstance implies, that they must have been previously _preserved_, and hence the name." Such then was the _right of capture_.

It was a right, which the circumstance of _taking_ the vanquished, that is, of _preserving_ them alive, gave the conquerors to their persons.

By this right, as always including the idea of a previous preservation from death, the vanquished were said _to be slaves_[045]; and, "as all slaves," says Justinian, "are themselves in the power of others, and of course can have nothing of their own, so their effects followed the condition of their persons, and became the property of the captors." To examine this right, by which the vanquished were said to be slaves, we shall use the words of a celebrated Roman author, and apply them to the present case[046].

"If it is lawful," says he, "to deprive a man of his life, it is certainly not inconsistent with nature to rob him;" to rob him of his liberty.

We admit the conclusion to be just, if the supposition be the same: we allow, if men have a right to commit that, which is considered as a greater crime, that they have a right, at the same instant, to commit that, which is considered as a less.