But, to my mind, a provision, far more objectionable than the antiquated and unsatisfactory method of arbitration provided, was that which made an arbitral award reviewable on appeal to the Body of Delegates of the League, which could set aside the award even if the arbitrators had rendered a unanimous decision and compel a rehearing before other arbitrators.

International arbitration as a method of applying the principles of justice to disputes between nations would, in the first instance at least, have become a farce if this provision had been adopted.

As an award based on compromise is seldom, if ever, satisfactory to both parties, the right of appeal would in substantially every case have been invoked and the award would have been reviewed by the Body of Delegates, who would practically render a final decision since the new arbitrators would presumably adopt it.

The effect of this provision as to appeals was, therefore, to supplant judicial settlements by political compromises and diplomatic adjustments, in which the national interests of the judges, many of whom would be untrained in juridical procedure, would be decided, if not deciding, factors.

Manifestly the expediency of the moment would be far more potent in the decisions reached than the principles and precepts of international law.
I shall not express here my opinion as to the reasons which I believe impelled the President to insert in the Covenant these extraordinary provisions which deprived arbitral courts of that independence of the executive authority which has been in modern times considered essential to the impartial administration of justice.