How far he doubted the ability of the men whom he proposed to name as plenipotentiaries is wholly speculative.

Whatever plausible reason may be given, the true reason will probably never be known.
Not appreciating, at the time that Colonel House informed me of the President's plan to be present at the Conference, that the matter had gone as far as it had, and feeling very strongly that it would be a grave mistake for the President to take part in person in the negotiations, I felt it to be my duty, as his official adviser in foreign affairs and as one desirous to have him adopt a wise course, to state plainly to him my views.

It was with hesitation that I did this because the consequence of the non-attendance of the President would be to make me the head of the American Peace Commission at Paris.

There was the danger that my motive in opposing the President's attending the Conference would be misconstrued and that I might be suspected of acting from self-interest rather than from a sense of loyalty to my chief.
When, however, the armistice went into effect and the time arrived for completing the personnel of the American Commission, I determined that I ought not to remain silent.
The day after the cessation of hostilities, that is, on November 12, I made the following note: "I had a conference this noon with the President at the White House in relation to the Peace Conference.

I told him frankly that I thought the plan for him to attend was unwise and would be a mistake.
I said that I felt embarrassed in speaking to him about it because it would leave me at the head of the delegation, and I hoped that he understood that I spoke only out of a sense of duty.