We had confidence in the measures--most of them dependent on the manufacture of material--which were in course of preparation by the time the United States entered the war, but our opinion was that there was no _immediate_ solution beyond the provision of additional vessels for the protection of shipping, and the reason for this view was that time was required before other measures could be put into effective operation; this is evident from the final paragraph of my telegram to Admiral de Chair, dated April 26, which I have quoted.
The first division of six United States destroyers, under the command of Lieut.-Commander T.K.Taussig, arrived in British waters on May 2, and they were most welcome.

It was interesting to me personally that Lieut.-Commander Taussig should be in command, as he, when a sub-lieutenant, had been wounded on the same day as myself during the Boxer campaign in China, and we had been together for some time subsequently.
At about this time our advice was sought by the United States Navy Department as to the best type of anti-submarine craft for the United States to build; on this subject a very short experience in the war theatre caused Admiral Sims to hold precisely similar views to myself.
As a result of the advice tendered a great building programme of destroyers, large submarine-hunting motor launches and other small craft was embarked upon.

Although the completion of these vessels was delayed considerably beyond anticipated dates, they did, in 1918, exercise an influence on the submarine war.
The Germans made one great mistake, for which we were thankful.

As already mentioned, it was anticipated that they would send submarines to work off the United States coast immediately after the declaration of war by that country.

Indeed we were expecting to hear of the presence of submarines in the West Atlantic throughout the whole of 1917.