The real need in the Mediterranean, as was frequently pointed out, was the inclusion of the naval forces of all the Allied nations under one single command.
In 1918 strong efforts were made to carry out this policy, and indeed the actual Admiralissimo was selected, but the attempt failed in the end.
Both these distinguished American officers were reminded, as indeed they must have seen for themselves, that the successful combating of the submarine danger depended largely on the manufacture of material, and that the resources of this country, with its great fleet and its large and increasing armies, were so seriously taxed that the execution of the plans of the Admiralty were being constantly and gravely delayed.

The Admiralty was, indeed, seriously embarrassed by difficulties in the adequate supply of mines and other means of destroying submarines as well as of fast craft of various descriptions.

The Admiralty, as was pointed out, were doing not what they would like to do, but what they could do, both in the way of offensive and defensive action.

The supplies of raw material and labour controlled in large measure the character and extent of the operations at sea..