[The Crisis of the Naval War by John Rushworth Jellicoe]@TWC D-Link book
The Crisis of the Naval War

CHAPTER VI
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A large number of kite balloon stations for anti-submarine work had been or were being established round the coast for this work.
As to the future programme of rigid airships, Admiral Mayo was told that it was under consideration to construct three new rigid stations, also that three new stations for the use of non-rigids for anti-submarine work were to be established, while it was also proposed to provide sufficient resources to allow of a number of kite balloons being worked in vessels between the North of Scotland and Norway and to the eastward of the English Channel.
Admiral Mayo was also informed that it was proposed to provide sufficient "heavier than air" craft of various types for the Fleet, both to insure adequate air reconnaissance and to drive off hostile aircraft.
The Grand Fleet was at the time already provided with three seaplane carriers, and the _Furious_ and other special vessels were being fitted to carry aircraft.

Many of the armoured vessels and light cruisers of the Fleet had also been fitted to carry aircraft, whilst the Harwich light cruiser force possessed one seaplane carrier; two carriers were devoted to anti-submarine work, and three were employed in the Mediterranean.
It was further stated that machines for naval reconnaissance were working from several East Coast stations, and that lighters to carry seaplanes for more extended reconnaissance and offensive work were under construction.

The work carried out by our naval aircraft off the Belgian coast, comprising the duty of keeping the coast under constant observation, of spotting the gunfire of ships, of fighting aircraft and bombing objectives of importance, were also mentioned, as well as the work in the Mediterranean, where there were four bases in the Aegean.
The extensive anti-submarine patrol work round the British Isles and in the Mediterranean was touched upon, there being "heavier than air" stations at the time at Houton Bay.
Dundee.
South Shields.
Bembridge.
Calshot.
Portland.
Killingholme.
Yarmouth.
Felixstowe.
Westgate.
Dover.
Newhaven.
Cherbourg.
Plymouth.
Newlyn.
Scilly.
Fishguard.
Steps were being taken to extend the number of stations as soon as possible, the new programme including stations at such places as Padstow.
Wexford.
Queenstown.
Berehaven.
Loch Foyle.
Loch Ryan (or in the Hebrides).
Shetlands.
Peterhead.
In the event of the United States being in a position to co-operate in the work, it was recommended that the three main seaplane stations in Ireland should be taken over by the Americans, and equipped, manned and controlled entirely by United States personnel.
In regard to the convoy system a full description of the whole organization was given, with the results up to date, and details of the vessels available and still needed for its protection.
Full information was afforded on the subject of the arming of merchant ships and fitting other defensive measures to them, and the routeing system in use for merchant ships was described in detail.
In the remarks on our anti-submarine warfare it was pointed out that anti-submarine measures were carried out both on the surface, under water, and in the air.
The surface measures were described as follows: In twelve of the twenty-two areas into which the waters round the United Kingdom were divided, regular _hunting flotillas_ were at work, comprising trawlers and motor launches fitted with hydrophones.

Before the institution of the convoy system a few fast vessels, such as destroyers or "P" boats, had been formed into hunting flotillas, but the convoy work had necessitated the withdrawal of all these vessels, and the work of the flotillas had suffered in consequence, the speed of trawlers being too slow to offer the same prospect of success in such anti-submarine measures.

The flotillas of motor launches which had been formed were of considerable utility in fine weather, but they could only operate in comparatively smooth water.
At the time of Admiral Mayo's visit a force of thirty-two trawlers to work with about six sloops or destroyers was being organized as vessels became available, to operate in the North Sea with a view to engaging enemy submarines on passage in those waters.
It was also pointed out to Admiral Mayo that the coast patrol vessels which were not actually in the hunting flotillas were all engaged in anti-submarine work and did frequently come into action against the German submarines.
Finally Admiral Mayo was informed that the convoy system itself was looked upon as an offensive measure since the German submarines would, in order to attack vessels under convoy, be forced into contact with the fast craft engaged in the work of escort and thus place themselves in positions in which they could themselves be successfully attacked.
Admiral Mayo, during his stay in European waters, inspected some of our naval bases and paid a visit to the Grand Fleet.
He crossed to France in order that he might see the work being carried out at French ports by vessels of the United States Navy, and while returning from this visit he honoured the British Navy by accompanying Sir Reginald Bacon and myself in H.M.S._Broke_ to witness a bombardment of Ostend by the monitor _Terror_.


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