The former protected the communications of the armies in France, whilst the two combined covered the maritime communications of the world outside the North Sea and Baltic, and if they could be effectively guarded our first two objects would be attained.
So far as the Dover exit was concerned we stated that the narrowness of the waters, with the consequent risk to the enemy from our mines and torpedoes, had so far acted as a deterrent to his capital ships; we had to depend on the light forces at Harwich and Dover to deal with any enemy surface craft attacking the southern area from German ports.
We pointed out that the control of the Norway-Scotland exit depended upon the presence of the Grand Fleet at Rosyth or at Scapa.

This fleet ensured the safety of all the vessels engaged in protecting trade and in hunting submarines outside the North Sea.
Mention was made of the fact that the enemy could not open the sea routes for his own war ships without risking a serious action, and that so far he had shown no inclination to run that risk.

The Battle of Jutland having been fought in the previous year, any future movement of the High Sea Fleet into the North Sea would probably be merely with the object of drawing our capital ships into prepared areas so as to bring about a process of attrition by mines and torpedoes.

Such a movement had been carried out on August 19, 1916.

The reasons which had led to the adoption of the Orkney-Faroe-Iceland blockade line were also explained.
It was pointed out that in the early stages of the war, the foregoing general dispositions had sufficed to protect the Allies' communications and to throttle those of the enemy outside the Baltic.