[The Crisis of the Naval War by John Rushworth Jellicoe]@TWC D-Link bookThe Crisis of the Naval War CHAPTER VI 1/25
CHAPTER VI. THE ENTRY OF THE UNITED STATES; OUR NAVAL POLICY EXPLAINED The entry of the United States of America into the war in April, 1917, had an important although not an immediate effect upon our Naval policy. That the effect was not immediate was due to the fact that the United States Navy was at the time indifferently provided with the particular classes of vessels which were so greatly needed for submarine warfare, viz.
destroyers and other small surface craft, submarines and light cruisers; further, the United States mercantile fleet did not include any considerable number of small craft which could be usefully employed for patrol and escort duty.
The armed forces of the United States of America were also poorly equipped with aircraft, and had none available for Naval work.
According to our knowledge at the time the United States Navy, in April, 1917, possessed twenty-three large and about twenty-four small destroyers, some of which were unfit to cross the Atlantic; there were about twelve submarines capable of working overseas, but not well suited for anti-submarine work, and only three light cruisers of the "Chester" class.
On the other hand about seven armoured cruisers were available in Atlantic waters for convoy duties, and the Navy included a fine force of battleships, of which fourteen were in full commission in April. At first, therefore, it was clear that the assistance which could be given to the Allied Navies would be but slight even if all available destroyers were sent to European waters.
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