The _Strongbow_, shelled at close range, returned the fire, using guns and torpedoes, but was completely overwhelmed by the guns of the light cruisers and sank at about 9.30 A.M.The trawler _Elsie_ effected very fine rescue work amongst the survivors both from the _Strongbow_ and ships of the convoy, whilst under fire, and both trawlers reached Lerwick.

The enemy sheered off soon after 8.0 A.M.

Most unfortunately neither the _Strongbow_ nor the _Mary Rose_ succeeded in getting a wireless signal through to our own vessels to report the presence of enemy ships, otherwise there can be little doubt that they would have been intercepted and sunk.

We had in the North Sea, during the night before the attack and during the day of the attack, a particularly strong force of light cruisers comprising four or possibly five squadrons (a total of not less than sixteen vessels), all to the southward of the convoy route, and had the information of the attack come through from the destroyers, these vessels would have been informed at once and would have had an excellent chance of intercepting the enemy.

The extreme difficulty of preventing the egress of raiders from the North Sea at night, even when so large a force is cruising, was well illustrated by this incident, although a little reflection on the wide area of water to be covered, together with a knowledge of the distance that the eye can cover on a dark night (some 200 to 300 yards), would show how very great are the chances in favour of evasion.
This disaster to the Scandinavian convoy was bound to bring into prominence the question of affording to it protection against future attacks by surface vessels, for necessarily the protection against surface vessels differed from that against submarines, a point which was sometimes overlooked by those who were unfamiliar with the demands of the two wars which were being waged--the one on the surface and the other under the surface.