[The Crisis of the Naval War by John Rushworth Jellicoe]@TWC D-Link bookThe Crisis of the Naval War CHAPTER III 19/55
The figures given in Chapter IX of the number of submarines sunk during the war by aircraft (viz.
7 as a minimum), when compared with the number of attacks during 1917 alone suggest the difficulties of successful attack. In September, 1917, as extensive a programme as was consistent with manufacturing capabilities, in view of the enormous demands of the Army, was drawn up by the Naval Staff for the development of aircraft for anti-submarine operations during 1918. The main developments were in machines of the large "America" type and heavy bombing machines for attacking enemy bases, as well as other anti-submarine machines and aircraft for use with the Grand Fleet. Included in the anti-submarine operations of aircraft during 1917 were the bombing attacks on Bruges, since the German submarines and the shelters in which they took refuge were part of the objective. These attacks were carried out from the aerodrome established by the Royal Naval Air Service at Dunkirk.
During 1917 the Naval Air Forces of the Dover Command, which included the squadrons at Dunkirk, were under the command of Captain C.L.Lambe, R.N., and the operations of this force were of a very strenuous character and of the utmost value. Bombing operations prior to the year of 1917 had been carried out by various types of machines, but the introduction of the Handley-Page aeroplanes in the spring of 1917 enabled a much greater weight of bombs--viz.
some 1,500 lbs .-- to be carried than had hitherto been possible.
These machines were generally used for night bombing, and the weight of bombs dropped on the enemy bases in Belgium rose with great rapidity as machines of the Handley-Page type were delivered, as did the number of nights on which attacks were made.
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