[The Crisis of the Naval War by John Rushworth Jellicoe]@TWC D-Link book
The Crisis of the Naval War

CHAPTER I
31/34

As regards the general Admiralty organization, there was no change except that caused by the disappearance of the separate Naval Air Service, the addition of a Second Civil Lord, and some reorganization of the Board of Invention and Research which had been under discussion for some months previously.
It is probable that in 1918 the Chief of the Naval Staff had more time at his disposal than was the case in 1917, owing to the changes in organization initiated in the later year having reached some finality and to the fact that the numerous anti-submarine measures put in hand in 1917 had become effective in 1918.
The future Admiralty Naval Staff organization, which was in my mind at the end of 1917, was a development of that shown in Table A, p.

20, subject to the following remarks: In the organization then adopted the personality and experience during the war of many of the officers in high positions were of necessity considered, and the organization to that extent adapted to circumstances.

This resulted in somewhat overloading the staff at the head, and the principle on which the Board of Admiralty works, i.e., that its members are colleagues one of another, and seniority in rank does not, theoretically, give greater weight in council, was not altogether followed.

Thus the Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff, the Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff, and the Deputy First Sea Lord were, by the nature of their duties, subordinate to the Chief of the Naval Staff and yet were members of the Board.

The well-known loyalty of naval officers to one another tended to minimize any difficulties that might have arisen from this anomaly, but the arrangement might conceivably give rise to difficulty, and is best avoided if the Board system is to remain.
The situation would be clearer if two of the three officers concerned were removed altogether from the Board, viz., the Deputy First Sea Lord and the Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff, leaving only the Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff as a member of the Board to act in the absence of the Chief of the Naval Staff and to relieve him of the administrative and technical work not immediately connected with operations.
The work of the two officers thus removed should, under these conditions, be undertaken by officers who should preferably be Flag Officers, with experience in command at sea, having the titles of Directors of Operations, whose emoluments should be commensurate with their position and responsibilities.
I did not consider it advisable to carry out this alteration during the war, and it was also difficult under the hour to hour stress of war to rearrange all the duties of the Naval Staff in the manner most convenient to the conduct of Staff business, although its desirability was recognized during 1917.
It may be as well to close this chapter by a few remarks on Staff work generally in the Navy.


<<Back  Index  Next>>

D-Link book Top

TWC mobile books