If he thought he had glass legs his mind was undoubtedly deranged--whether enough or not enough to constitute him irresponsible or beyond the effect of penal discipline might be a difficult question.

The generally accepted doctrine is, that if a man has a delusion concerning something, which if actually existing as he believed it to be would be no excuse for his committing the criminal act, he is responsible and liable to punishment; but, as Bishop well says: "This branch of the doctrine should be cautiously received; for delusion of any kind is strongly indicative of a generally diseased mind." The new test to determine responsibility will recognize, as does the law of Germany, that there can be no criminal act where the free determination of the will is excluded by disease, and that the capacity to distinguish between right and wrong is inconclusive.

It may perhaps have to take a general form, leaving it to a lay, or a mixed lay-and-expert jury to say merely whether the accused had a disease of the mind of a type recognized by science, and whether the alleged criminal act was of such a character as would naturally flow from that type of insanity, in which case it would seem obviously just to regard the defendant as partially irresponsible, and perhaps entirely so.
Possibly the practical needs of the moment might be met by permitting such a jury to determine whether the defendant had such a knowledge of the wrongful nature and consequences of his act and such a control over his will as to be a proper subject of punishment.* This would require the jury to find that the defendant had some knowledge of right and wrong and the power to choose between them.

In any event, to render the accused entirely irresponsible, his act should arise out of and be caused solely by the diseased condition of his mind.

The law, while asserting the responsibility of many insane people, should recognize "partial" responsibility as well.
*See State vs.