The Emperor, on the contrary, had been appealed to by the Duke of Nevers, the Elector of Saxony, the Margrave of Burgau, and other liege subjects of the Imperial crown as a matter of course and of right.

This policy of the King, if persisted in, said Teynagel, must lead to war.

Henry might begin such a war, but he would be obliged to bequeath it to the Dauphin.

He should remember that France had always been unlucky when waging war with the Empire and with the house of Austria.' The Chancellor and Villeroy, although in their hearts not much in love with Henry's course, answered the emissary with arrogance equal to his own that their king could finish the war as well as begin it, that he confided in his strength and the justice of his cause, and that he knew very well and esteemed very little the combined forces of Spain and the Empire.

They added that France was bound by the treaty of Vervins to protect the princes, but they offered no proof of that rather startling proposition.
Meantime Teynagel was busy in demonstrating that the princes of Germany were in reality much more afraid of Henry than of the Emperor.