[History of the United Netherlands<br> 1584-1609 by John Lothrop Motley]@TWC D-Link book
History of the United Netherlands
1584-1609

CHAPTER XIX
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They could not contend with a storm, much less with the enemy's ships, which would destroy them utterly in case of a meeting, without his being able to avail himself of his soldiers--who would be so closely packed as to be hardly moveable--or of any human help.

The preposterous notion that he should come out with his flotilla to make a junction with Medina off Calais, was over and over again denounced by Alexander with vehemence and bitterness, and most boding expressions were used by him as to the probable result, were such a delusion persisted in.
Every possible precaution therefore but one had been taken.

The King of France--almost at the same instant in which Guise had been receiving his latest instructions from the Escorial for dethroning and destroying that monarch--had been assured by Philip of his inalienable affection; had been informed of the object of this great naval expedition--which was not by any means, as Mendoza had stated to Henry, an enterprise against France or England, but only a determined attempt to clear the sea, once for all, of these English pirates who had done so much damage for years past on the high seas--and had been requested, in case any Spanish ship should be driven by stress of weather into French ports, to afford them that comfort and protection to which the vessels of so close and friendly an ally were entitled.
Thus there was bread, beef, and powder enough--there were monks and priests enough--standards, galley-slaves, and inquisitors enough; but there were no light vessels in the Armada, and no heavy vessels in Parma's fleet.

Medina could not go to Farnese, nor could Farnese come to Medina.

The junction was likely to be difficult, and yet it had never once entered the heads of Philip or his counsellors to provide for that difficulty.


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