I see no contradiction in supposing a desire of producing misery annexed to love, and of happiness to hatred.

If the sensation of the passion and desire be opposite, nature coued have altered the sensation without altering the tendency of the desire, and by that means made them compatible with each other.
SECT.

VII OF COMPASSION But though the desire of the happiness or misery of others, according to the love or hatred we bear them, be an arbitrary and original instinct implanted in our nature, we find it may be counterfeited on many occasions, and may arise from secondary principles.

Pity is a concern for, and malice a joy in the misery of others, without any friendship or enmity to occasion this concern or joy.

We pity even strangers, and such as are perfectly indifferent to us: And if our ill-will to another proceed from any harm or injury, it is not, properly speaking, malice, but revenge.